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ABSTRACT
The Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI) has initiated a research project that
profiles the perpetrators of hostage and barricade incidents. This research is conducted
using a questionnaire that is completed at incident conclusion. The questionnaire was
provide .. by the FBI as part of a project called HOBAS (Hostage, Barricade, and
Suicide). The HOBAS information is distributed electronically and in print to member
law enforcement agencies. HOBAS information is used in this project as the main source
of secondary data. The University of Louisville School of Medicine supplied an
additional source of secondary data.
There are 24 questionnaires that make up the primary information. The HOBAS
database covers 1,828 incidents, and 120 incidents are described in the information from
Louisville. There is not enough primary data to constitute valid research from a statistical
standpoint. However, for the purposes of future research, the three sources are listed and
discussed in a preliminary manner. The premise that the perpetrators of these incidents
and the incidents themselves have common factors is demonstrated. Unique aspects of
the incidents that have occurred in Georgia are also discussed.
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INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM
Regrettably, hostage and/or barricaded gunman incidents are not rare occurrences
throughout the United States :>r in the state of Georgia, the latter of which is the main
emphasis of this project. As taken from the questionnaire used in this project, a barricade
incident involves a person who refuses to come out of a fortified position or release a
victim where there is no substantive demand. A hostage incident occurs when a person
(or persons) is held against his or her will and the captor has made substantive demands.
As an example for definition, a common occurrence when both of these occur is when an
individual 'barricades' himself inside his home and holds his family there against their
wishes. More often than not, some type of standoff with law enforcement ensues.
However, due to the independent mature of law enforcement organizations in America,
exact details about the frequency and distribution of these incidents would be nearly
impossible to research, let alone count. The Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI), in
research that will be particularly described later, provided information on 32 incidents
during a four year period from June of 1995 through mid-June of 1999.
Shortly after the incident wiin the Branch Davidians in Waco, Texas, in 1993, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) launched a substantial internal campaign to
produce a system that collects, analyzes, and disseminates research obtained on hostage
and barricade incidents. The violent end to the standoff between law enforcement and the
Davidians opened some eyes, to say the very least. One of the tools of this campaign is
the Hostage Barricade Database, otherwise known as HOBAS. As of the end of June
1999, the HOBAS had 1,828 incidents on record (Howard and Murphy, 1999: 13-14, 30).
There exist a number of law enforcement publications and organizations
nationwide whose goals are to educate their brothers and sisters about a variety of issues.
Only recently though has a central clearinghouse of information come into existence
about hostage and/or barricade situations. That clearinghouse is the HOBAS, and part of
its purpose is to allow law enforcement personnel to review statistics on similar incidents
so that they may better prepare themselves to handle their own incidents. Specific to the
GBI's response teams, information will be provided later about steps taken in the same
direction.
The HOBAS project is in place to address all of the issues that have been
mentioned. Part of its purpose is to count hostage and barricaded gunman incidents.
Another purpose of the HOBAS is to make available information that law enforcement
may use to improve incident responses. The HOBAS also serves in that capacity as a
provider of statistical information that may be used to predetermine incident perpetrators.
Finally, the HOBAS is a two-way information handler. Agencies across the country
submit information to the database and may retrieve information at will. By proxy, the
HOBAS is making dozens of agencies nationwide work together on the issue of response
effectiveness to these types of incidents.
The problem in this project is the collection of appropriate HOBAS information
from qualified incidents that the GBI's Special Response Team (SRT) has been involved
with. How that information falls in line with the FBI's HOBAS statistics is another factor
here. An attempt will be made to characterize the offenders of these incidents and the
incidents themselves. Compansons will be made to information provided by Dr.
Theodore Feldman of the University of Louisville. Project hypotheses are presented in
their own section.
This project has implications for law enforcement leaders and managers across
the country. The information provided herein can even be applied to the larger population
of all law enforcement officers, in that the uniformed patrol officer is usually the first one
on the scene of a hostage or barricaded gunman incident. The information and data found
herein can also be cross-disciplinary. Psychologists, psychiatrists, and other medical
personnel may be interested in some of the data as it pertains to mental illness and
substance abuse issues. Criminal justice individuals, other than those active in police
operations, may be interested in this information in general or in some of the categories
specific to a given area of interest. Social workers and others in a counseling capacity
may be interested in the causes and outcomes of these incidents as they relate to the
offender(s) as well as the victim(s). The importance of this work to special response
teams and/or hostage negotiators should be self-evident. Students and professionals in
criminal justice stand to gain unique insight into this field from a variety of angles.
For clarity and variety of writing and reading, several liberties were taken with
terms and wording herein. Dr. Feldman's research is also known as the Louisville
database, and the primary data gathered from the GBI is often called Georgia data, the
Georgia factor, and/or is simply referenced as coming from the GBI or primary data. SRT
and SWA Tare synonymous, although SWAT usually reters to the general association
with special response teams while SRT primarily refers to the GBI's teams. The context
in which each term is used will provide the necessary connotation(s). The acronym
HOBAS is used in a variety of ways. Sometimes it will be referred to as the HOBAS, and
at other times the term will be used as if it is a proper name. The term critical incident or
incident refers to qualifying hostage and barricade events, which are occasionally referred
to as a crisis.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The problem of collecting critical incident information, and its distribution
through the HOBAS database or any other means, is a limited field of study. In an early
review of these matters that will be discussed shortly, the FBI has stated as much.
"Unfortunately, little comprehensive data exist concerning crisis negotiation activities in
the United States" (Hammer, et al, 1994: 1). Another article that appeared in the FBI Law
Enforcement Bulletin in 1991 covers the subject in great detail, and is a valuable read to
any interested party. However, nowhere therein is any type of database or central
information location mentioned. Inadvertently though, this second article does make the
point attempted throughout this document:
Before any decisions are made, the on-scene commander should evaluate the
presence of high-risk factors, consider all other intelligence available, and
combine this information with the assessments made by both the negotiation and
tactical teams. This combine nformation will assist the commander in
differentiating between a genuine hostage situation, a pseudo-hostage situation,
and an intended homicide incident (Fuselier, et al, 1991: 10).
The key point to be remembered from the above selection is "...consider all other
intelligence available...", in that intelligence is described as all knowledge of any given
subject collected from any source.
Theodore Feldman, MD, of the University of Louisville, KY, has done a great
deal of research into these exact matters. His interest on the subject from a medical point
of view provides further credibility and a slightly different angle on this project. Without
any delay in his study, he concurs with the absence of direct work: "While the law
enforcement literature contains many references on hostage negotiation strategies,
relatively little scientific data exists on the characteristics of these incidents" (Feldman,
1996: 3).
Dr. Feldman describes from that point the database founded in 1996 by the
Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences at the University of Louisville School
of Medicine. Quite similar to the HOBAS, at least in information stored, Dr. Feldman's
database will be compared to the HOBAS information in a side-by-side manner later in
this paper.
In the meantime, an overview of critically relevant points of the Louisville
database is presented in list form so that parallels will be readily apparent.
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The Louisville database examined three types of incidents: hostage
incidents, barricaded subjects without hostages, and barricaded subjects
who held hostages.
2. The Louisville database evaluated the situational and behavioral factors
which influenced hostage and barricade situations. (Psychological factors
were also evaluated, but are out of the scope of this project.)
3. Two levels of data were used in situational and behavioral analysis: the
characteristics of the incident, and the characteristics of the perpetrator.
Additionally, Dr, Feldman directly states that "[t]he objectives of the study were
to identify the motivations for hostage-taking and barricades, develop a comprehensive
psychological profile of offenders, explore the factors that influenced outcome of the
incidents, and improve negotiation strategies and crisis management procedures used by
law enforcement agencies" (Feldman, 1996: 5). His work goes hand-in-hand with this
work and the GBI's objectives, and similarly fits some of the categories of data found in
the HOBAS.
Nonetheless, generally or specifically, some research about the subject and a
small amount of material on the matter has been produced. What is perhaps even more
prolific than the academic an : professional investigations into critical incidents is the
coverage that the printed media provides. For better or worse, the popular mediums that
news travels on have brought the issue to light.
Most of the articles that follow were printed as news facts only, and are relatively
succinct. However, as appropriate, investigative findings indicate that the interest in these
matters has a broad scope.
The incidents described in the excerpts from Georgia newspapers were gathered
completely at random. Those incidents were read and the articles collected in an
infrequent manner based on opportunity, not on careful scrutiny of several newspapers on
a daily basis. Citations are presented at the front of each excerpt, as listed by the parent
paper as indicated.
Excerpts from the Columbus Ledger-Enquirer, Sunday, January 2, 2000:
Officers conclude 12-hour standoff. Assat. t of rural Clay County home ends
authorities' standoff with armed former mental patient.
By Harry Franklin, State Editor
A 12-hour standoff between authorities and an armed former mental patient was
brought to a close early New Year's Day. Law enforcement officers successfully
subdued the subject after making a tactical assault on the house in rural Clay
County. Melvin R. McCoy, 47. . .was taken into custody about 3 a.m. at his
house. . .A five-member Special Response Team made up of Georgia Bureau of
Investigation agents and Georgia State Patrol officers was brought in from across
the state Friday evening to help sheriffs deputies. . .[The county sheriff] had
negotiated with McCoy for hours without convincing him to surrender...During
an assault on the house... incendiaries were used to try to isolate McCoy inside the
house... Officers recovered a 20-gauge shotgun and a .22-caliber pistol after
McCoy was subdued... [h]e will face aggravated assault charges... "I saw some
very exemplary police work during the last night," [the sheriff] said. "The state of
Georgia, I'm satisfied, has some real professionals. Some came by chopper and
some by car. We had probably 40 officers there at various times" (Franklin, 2000:
B1,B4).
Excerpts from the LaGrange Daily News, Sunday, March 19, 2000:
Killing suspect stays holed up with hostages
DUNDALK, Md. (AP)-A heavily armed man suspected of killing four people
remained holed up with at least three hostages in an apartment late Saturday, as
relatives and friends pleaded for him to come out. . .Law officers converged on the
building at about 9:30 p.m. Friday, and were negotiating with Palczynski by
telephone... Palczynski was holding hostage [his ex-girlfriend's] mother, her
brother and the mother's boyfriend, police said. . ."We have a philosophy of
surround and talk," said Baltimore County Police spokesman Bill Toohey said
[sic] Saturday... Palczynski has said that if he were faced with -eturning to jail, he
would kill himself or make police shoot him. . .Palczynski has been in a similar
position before. In 1992, he kept police in Idaho at bay for 16 hours following a
domestic complaint by a girlfriend. He was finally forced out with tear gas
(Associated Press, 2000: 1,2).
Mr. Palczynski was later killed by law enforcement after two of the three
hostages escaped and an assault was conducted to rescue the third hostage.
Excerpts from the Athens Daily News, Tuesday, December 28, 1999:
Police reviewing standoff procedures. Athens man still at large after eluding
officers on Christmas.
By Stephen Gurr, Staff Writer
Athens-Clarke police are reviewing procedures used during a 13-hour Christmas
Day standoff in which a shooting suspect managed to slip past 20 law
enforcement officers and escape... Marcus Lamont Easley was still at large
Monday, wanted for aggravated assault on a police officer. Police say Easley, 19,
barricaded himself and a girlfriend in [a] residence and later fired three shots from
the home at officers... Assistant Police Chief Mark Wallace, who was in
command of the scene Saturday, said. . ."Certainly, everyone is preparing reviews
on what occurred" (Gurr, 1999: 1 A, 7A).
Excerpts from the Columbus Ledger-Enquirer, Friday, March 24, 1000:
Man commits suicide after rooftop standoff
DI\ HILLS, N.Y.-A man who fatally shot himself during a rooftop standoff
committed suicide after killing his stepson. . John Fenrich Jr., 36, began his siege
[after involving the local media]. The station then called police, auinorities said
(contributor unknown, 2000: A4).
The following excerpts from the Atlanta Constitution (February 10, 2000) detail
some facts and findings surrounding an incident that occurred in Austell, GA, in July of
1999. Two Cobb County police officers lost their lives upon a tactical assault into a
residence where the suspect barricaded himself inside his home with his 73 year old
mother. This incident received a fair amount of attention - and criticism - in the media in
and around the Atlanta area. The presentation of this case, and the others, is not presented
for the purposes of pointing out individual or professional errors or wrongdoing. As
documented, this case and others are offered for illustrative and learning purposes.
Cobb SWAT chief haunted by deaths
By Steve Visser
Lt. Steve Merrifield has spent 13 years bursting into homes to arrest
gunmen. Until July, none of the good guys had died trying. . .Merrifield, who has
commanded Cobb's SWAT team for two years, was in charge of the July .13 raid
on a gunman holed up in nis home near Austell. As they entered, Sgt. Steve
Reeves, 35, and Officer Stephen Gilner, 32, were fatally wounded by Greg Smith.
A report issued this week by the National Tactical Officers Association
[NTOA] of Pennsylvania said faulty strategy by Merrifield contributed to the
deaths. Specifically, the independent investigators said the 12-man SWAT
team was undermanned, and the rescue of the gunman's mother inside the
house shouldn't have been attempted without reinforcements... The association's
report faulted the entire SWAT plan that night...The core finding of the
investigation is that Merrifield should have known he didn't have enough men,
and he should have called in help from outside agencies before attempting a
rescue. . .Merrifield said that the critical problem of that night was poor
information about the layout of the house, which put his men in the gunsights of
an expert marksman who insisted on fighting and dying. (Visser, 2000: Al, A 10).
Amid the ongoing controversy following the release of the investigation's findings
about thi incident, the Atlanta Journal-Constitution came out with a follow-up article on
February 20, 2000.
SWAT teams need unity, chief says
July tragedy: Lack of manpower seen as contributor to two deaths.
By Steve Visser [with contributions by staff writer Jack Warner]
Marietta police Chief Bobby Moody learned a hard lesson from the deaths of two
Cobb County officers. Even when they're facing a single armed man, metro
Atlanta SWAT teams need more strength in numbers. "What everybody in a
command position is saying is that we need to get these SWAT teams together,"
said Moody, a former president of the International Association of Chiefs of
Police. Last year, the SWAT team from one of Atlanta's best-trained law agencies
- the 500-officer Cobb County police - found it couldn't overcome a mentally ill
gunman who was also a crack shot. The five-man entry team found itself trapped
in a kitchen facing a hail of buckshot coming down a narrow hallway. Two
officers died. . .It is unclear how many SWAT teams operate in the state - sheriffs
and police departments form and disband them at will. But most likely have fewer
than 20 officers, and few could afford in terms of either money or manpower to
expand. Upon reading the [above] report's criticism of the Cobb SWAT team.
Moody ordered his own 140[sic]-officer department's team expanded to 20. But
he suspects that number - plenty to contain a house - could still leave him short-
handed if his department faced a hostage situation. So he and Cobb Chief Lee
New and Sheriff Bill Huston are discussing having their teams train together
occasionally so the> 11 be comfortable working together on major operations.
That would raise the total SWAT force in Cobb to 70 officers - a big-league
number comparable to Los Angeles or Dallas, except the officers in Cobb will be
part-time SWAT team members, training 18 hours a month instead of full-time
training 40 hours. It's unclear, however, how well the organization will work.
Moody would like to see metro Atlanta SWAT teams cooperate - at the very
least meet regularly and share information - across county lines. . ."Mutual aid is
not a new concept," said Steve Smith, an expert on forming multi-junsdictional
SWAT teams. Smith is a captain with the SWAT team for the Lenexa, Kan.,
Police Department, which has 16 officers, he also heads the Kansas City Metro
SWAT Association, which he said can swell his 16-member SWAT team to 102.
The real strength of the teams isn't as much their mutual support during
hostage rescues as their ability to relieve one another during days-long
confrontations with barricaded gunmen. Smith said what can keep multi-
jurisdictional teams from working is interdepartment rivalries. "Everybody
clashes and butts heads," he said. "The reason we created our organization in 1989
was to share knowledge and experience. Tactical people have to take care of
themselves because that's usually one of the first places the budget axe falls."
Building trust is critical for multi-jurisdictional teams to work... David Klinger, a
criminologist with the University of Missouri in St. Louis who works with SWAT
teams on tactics, said having a skilled SWAT team is a public safety question.
The NTOA report said Cobb has had 24 hostage incidents since 1994 - what is
termed a "significant number." "Every community should have a tactical response
capability to manage a hostage rescue," Klinger said. "They need to understand, in
my opinion, that they have limitations. How many places around the country can
afford to have a full-time team that trains for these things? Not that many. You
can't expect a smaller department to perform like a major-league team."
Mernfield, who is being relieved as the SWAT commander next week, disputed
the report's conclusion that his plan for taking the gunman was flawed. He said
he had used similar plans successfully and never considered asking another
agency for support because they hadn't trained together. The plan's weakness was
flawed informal n, Mernfield said... Mernfield also acknowledged Sgt. Steve
Reeves and Officer Stephen Gilner died because they faced what experts call a
rarity: a barricaded gunman with both the skill and will to shoot down highly
trained officers (Visser and Warner, 2000: Dl, D6).
Many things should be gathered from the sampling of newspaper articles provided
that detail or summarize hostage and/or barricaded gunman incidents. First and foremost,
the frequency and distribution of these incidents across the United States should warrant
some concern. Second, it should be evident that law enforcement is in and of itself
reviewing these incidents whenever possible or necessitated. When appropriate, changes
in policies and procedures are recommended. Third, the observant reader should see some
common factors among the perpetrators of these incidents. Founh, as stated and implied,
an exchange of information among law enforcement agencies and SWAT teams is
overdue. Such exchanges of information in the law enforcement community will require
increased cooperation beyond the geographical and political boundaries ofjurisdictions.
Each of these main points, except for incident frequency, is covered to some degree in the
paragraphs that follow, as they relate to this paper.
As far as the review and exchange of information by law enforcement is
concerned, it is stated in the last article that there is a clear and obvious reluctance among
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law enforcement agencies to share information. The reasons for that are many and varied.
For those in law enforcement who will attempt ,o share information for the benefit of
those who will listen, the HOBAS is a great vehicle for this information to travel on. As
clearly indicated by the incident in Cobb County where two officers lost their lives, these
incidents are not without review by law enforcement. Nonetheless, the trick of the matter
is to apply what has been learned to future situations, regardless of where they may
occur.
There are a great deal of common factors in a number of hostage and barricaded
gunman incidents. The commonalties cover a variety of specific areas, which will be
listed later. However, as mentioned, even a cursory collection of information on the
incidents from the printed media can result in a number of similar facts. All of the
offenders in the articles presented were male. All of those incidents involved weapons
use (or access to weapons) by the offender. Each of the incidents involved standoffs with
law enforcement officers that lasted at least several hours. Eight deaths were associated
with the incidents. All five incidents occurred in a residence that was either the offender's
or the residence of someone known by the offender. Three tactical assaults occurred. It is
this type of information - the common factors - which make the collection of incident
information interesting and necessary. It is also relevant to note that the common
information can be analyzed in an effort to profile critical incident offenders before they
commit the types of acts as discussed. If that cannot be accomplished, at least the
incidents themselves will be somewhat predictable based on common factors.
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The secondary data in this project make up the largest quantity of actual research
numbers used. Some notes about the distributor of some of this data - the Internet - are
mentioned to further document one of the foundations on which this project is based.
Information technology and telecommunications have, as in all other arenas,
greatly influenced the way criminal justice operates. Along with the many obvious
advantages that new and imprc ed communications provide, the Internet is perhaps the
fastest growing and most popular electronic communications tool available to the public
today. The FBI has capitalized on this tool and created Law Enforcement OnLine,
commonly known as LEO. LEO was developed and is operated by the FBI and is for the
exclusive use of the law enforcement community. The LEO provides the following:
A national focal point for law e >rcement electronic communication, education,
and information sharing.
Eas> ccess through user-friendly interface.
Interactive computer communications linking all levels of U.S. law enforcement.
(FBI pamphlet, 1998: 1)
Furthermore, the FBI continues to describe the LEO system as ".. .supporting broad,
immediate dissemination of information. LEO is also used as a vehicle to educate officers
on the best technologies and practices in all areas of law enforcement" (FBI pamphlet,
1998: 3).
According to information about LEO provided to the GBI from the FBI in 1999,
the first prototype operation of the system had 20 users in September of 1995. The LEO
pilot program had 250 users a year later, and as of July 1, 1999, there were over 16,000
users. Federal law enforcement agencies comprised 27.8% of the users, State and Local
agencies made up 71.2% of the users, and Canadian and Other agencies made up almost
one percent of the LEO users (Howard and Murphy, 1999: 10). This information about
the LEO is worthy of note because the LEO houses the HOBAS database. Additionally,
the growth of LEO users is indicative of how rapidly the word is spreading that the LEO
is indeed the clearinghouse of information that the prudent law enforcement manager
wants his or her agency to be a part of.
The HOBAS database can be used to gather a wealth of information on barricaded
gunman and hostage incidents, as stated in the introduction. The FBI states that the
HOBAS "...is a post-incident data collection tool with the capability of providing
empirical and statistical data" (FBI pamphlet, 1998: 3). The information stored therein is
gathered from law enforcement agencies that participate in the LEO and submit data to
HOBAS. Specific information can be requested, and negotiators and other law
enforcement members of the system have access to that information 24 hours a day, from
anywhere on the planet, via the Internet (FBI pamphlet, 1998: 3). Particular details about
the HOBAS database, and the questionnaire that is its major means uf data collection, are
discussed in the Research Design and Methodology section of this document.
More generally speaking, and still in relation to the FBI's background and
literature on the matter, the following information is offered to indicate the origins of the
ideas that may have led to the cr tion of the HOBAS database:
Over 600 crisis/hostage negotiators and members of special operations teams
gathered in February 1992 to share ideas and exchange information and
experiences. During this seminar, conducted jointly by the Baltimore County,
Maryland, Police Department and the FBI, attendees from Federal, State, and
local law enforcement agencies throughout the United States reviewed five
hostage incidents. . .the authors [of this article] requested that hostage negotiation
unit team leaders attending the February seminar complete a crisis negotiation
survey (CNS). The survey was designed to identify the needs of crisis negotiation
teams (Hammer, et al, 1994: 1 ).
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While discussing the survey, the authors address these issues: team selection and training,
incident responses, the use of mental health professionals, information and training needs,
and the feasibility of establishing a national clearing house for crisis negotiation
(Hammer, et al, 1994: 1). The points relative to this project should be clear.
Some of the findings from this survey, which was completed by 100 team leaders,
are listed below:
Overall, little or no joint training was undertaken with SWAT teams.
Types of crisis situations where negotiation was needed, in sequence of the most
occurring:
Barricade incidents
Domestic situations
Suicides
Hostage takings
Criminal/high-risk arrest situations
Kidnappings
Top five information and training needs of the respondents, in priority order:
Assessing hostage-takers emotional stability
Resolution strategies
Negotiator communication skills and strategies
Suicide indicators
When to employ tactical strategies
(Hammer, et al, 1994: 4)
The similarities of the information asked for and taken from the survey are so
similar to the HOBAS database and questionnaire that it is easy to believe that this
seminar - and the concepts behind it - quite possibly led to the formation of the HOBAS.
Although this presumption is not confirmed, please bear in mind the following
information presented near the close of this reference:
The overwhelming majority (92%) of the respondents cited a need for a national
clearinghouse to collect, analyze, and disseminate the information regarding
crisis negotiation. Further, 94% of the team leaders indicated a willingness to use
such a clearinghouse, and 93% of the team leaders indicated willingness to
assist the clearinghouse by providing both information and audio 1* sual materials
on their crisis negotiation experiences (Hammer, et al, 1994: 4).
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A better jumping off point was not found in any literature pertaining to this project. Their
entire article conclusion is offered here to further document the origins of a central
clearinghouse and/or database.
The crisis negotiation survey provides preliminary insights into selected
demographic and functional characteristics of a sample of crisis/hostage
negotiation teams within the United States. It represents the first attempt
at collecting and disseminating information on hostage negotiation team
characteristics and crisis incidents.
The information obtained through the CNS can provide an initial benchmark
by which to assess the needs and functions of individual crisis/hostage
negotiation teams. Further, this information can be used to create effective
training and information dissemination programs. Most important, however,
the research can be used to identify and address the most critical needs of
crisis teams throughout the country (Hammer, et al, 1994: 4,5).
The application of the HOBAS to the GBI is a work in progress, but most of the
initial steps have been taken. There is one particular angle that the GBI has been
interested in from the inception of their own project. That angle is the one of the criminal
profile. The definition of a profile, or profiling, for these purposes, is taken from Criminal
Behavior: A Psychosocial Approach, written by Curt R. Bartol. In the first chapter of the
book, Bartol, in a discussion of Psychological Criminology, has this to say about
profiling:
Criminal profiling (also called psychological profiling or criminal personality
profiling) refers to the process of identifying personality traits, behavioral
tendencies, and demographic variables of an offender based on characteristics of
the crime. To a large extent, the profiling process is dictated by a database
collected on previous offenders who have committed similar offenses (Bartol,
1995: 15).
Please keep in mind the last part of the above citation; "...the profiling process is dictated
by a database collected on previous offenders who have committed similar offenses." It is
this idea of a database that this whole paper is based.
Every project has a beginning, and the work within the GBI that is represented
here started with an idea that was quickly put on paper as the work began. The internal
GBI memorandum that follows represents their interest in the profile as well as the
beginning of what has turned into this document, which is part of their larger goals.
To: Inspector Bob Ingram
From: SAC Fran B. Wiley
Crime Analysis Unit
Date: June 19, 1998
Ref: Criminal Analysis/ Profiling of SRT Incidents
Within the past year the GBI - SRT unit has responded to a number of critical
incidents regarding barricaded gunman/hostage situations in Georgia.
In the majority if not all of the situations the perpetrator was a white male, age
range from 35-45 years old. The question comes to mind: "Why is this?"
This unit will be examining all of the SRT incidents and interviewing Special
Agents to capture and analyze the data and information about the perpetrator in
each of the cidents.
The purpose of this is to anatomize the physiological and psychological traits and
characteristics of each offender in an effort to provide a common profile.
This information would be of great benefit to both the GBI and other law enforce-
ment agencies throughout the country.
This research would be conducted by the Crime Analysis Unit (SAC Fran B.
Wiley and S/A Keith Howard) in an effort to train our own agents and other
law enforcement agencies.
This project, when completed, will provide supervisors and officers with a better
understanding of the personality causing the often-deadly situations, and it will
assist in their response.
And so it began. The idea that offenders of hostage and barricade incidents in
Georgia could be profiled - prior to the commission of future incidents - was born. By
sheer coincidence, the FBI and GBI were developing this tram of thought at
approximately the same time. The FBI did have a bit of a head start, but that turned out to
be extremely advantageous to the GBI. This new aspect of criminal profiling would be
based in large part on a concept covered earlier: a central clearinghouse of information.
As a bonus, the information gathered at either clearinghouse, at the federal level or in
Georgia, would provide details about these incidents to any organization that wanted to
be a part of the LEO program.
The project at it applies to the GBI and their Special Response Teams (SRT
singularly) was formally introduced to supervisory GBI agents on January 25, 1999.
While present for 'in-service' training at Georgia's Public Safety Training Center, all
agents present were briefed on the GBFs project by Special Agent Ralph Stone, the
Director of the GBI's Training and D.A.R.E. unit. The purposes and intent of the project
were discussed during this briefing, and a booklet on the matter was passed out to all
agents present. Excerpts from the booklet follow:
In June 1998, during a meeting of the Behavioral Science Section, Inspector
Robert "Bob" Ingram questioned why the majority of Special Response Team
critical incidents had involved white males over 35 years of age... [He] expressed
that understanding the psychological traits and characteristics of these offenders
would benefit law enforcement. Inspector Ingram requested that a research project
be conducted... The research project attempts to assist critical incident managers
and hostage negotiators in making decisions regarding incidents that involve
barricaded gunmen, hostage situation, and/or armed subjects who attempt or
commit suicide. It was decided that a system would be developed to collect data
from each Special Response Team mission, which would then be combined with
the data from other missions (Howard and Murphy, 1999: 1).
It was no stroke of luck that the GBI happened upon the HOBAS project. It was a
matter of diligent research, which is what they are good at. In the initial phases of project
organization, the GBI learned about the HOBAS project and requested more information.
Upon receipt and review of that documentation, the GBI determined that the data - and
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the questionnaire - from the HOBAS project were indeed well suited to what the GBI
planned to initiate and execute. The GBI joined LEO, and the research project was
underway (Howard and Murphy, 1999: 1).
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND HYPOTHESES
Research Objectives
The objectives of this research come from the collective goals ot the GBI and the
researcher. The goal of the GBI is professionally operational in nature. They intend to
apply what is learned from the HOBAS to critical incidents that they respond to in
Georgia. The basic research performed from an academic standpoint is just that.
Nonetheless, for policy requirements or degree requirements, the objectives of the
research are mutually beneficial.
Generally speaking, the idea is to analyze critical incident data collected from
across the United States and apply it to future incidents. The genesis of these ideas, as
previously covered, presumes that all of these incidents share certain traits and
characteristics that will allow for categorization of the perpetrators and/or the incidents
themselves. Ultimately, such information will a : incident response commanders to
make informed decisions. All of this can be broken down into the categories of
perpetrator and incident analysis along with the arbitrarily assigned area of the Georgia
factor. This term indicates that these incidents and/or the people who commit them in the
state of Georgia have some type of unique characteristic that sets them apart from the
national aspects.
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Hypotheses
The objectives are condensed and listed as testable hypotheses:
1
.
Critical incidents share common traits.
2. Perpetrators of critical incidents share common traits.
3. In Georgia, either by event or individual, the traits of critical incidents
differ from the national commonalties.
Operationalized and Independent and Dependent Variables
Due to the descriptive nature of the research, a cause and effect relationship that
would entail the use and description of a conditional proposition (Fitzgerald and Cox,
1 994: 5 1 ) is not applicable to the hypotheses.
However, in the larger scheme of profiling these events, it can be said that the
common characteristics of these critical incidents, and those who commit them, may lead
to a better understanding of the subject that can be applied to future situations. That being
the case, and more directly speaking, the HOBAS database can be saiu to be part of the
cause that leads to the effect of better crisis management. That is big picture thinking, and
the point is offered for the purpose of tying the hypotheses together with the higher
objective. That is the extent of variable operationalization as applicable to this project,
although more details about the data are available as design and methodology are
discussed later.
Hypothesis Linkage to the Literature
The first hypothesis states that critical incidents share some common traits across
the country. The second hypothesis is more concerned with who actually committed these
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offenses. Commonalties by definition do not apply. The obvious fact that a barricaded
gunman incident actually involved a barricaded gunman is not a qualifier.
Some of the common factors of more concern are the ones found in the newspaper
articles presented earlier. Some of those factors include the same gender of all of the
perpetrators, the presence of violence and weapons, the duration of the standoffs with law
enforcement, the presence or holding of relatives as hostages, and the like.
Those factors, and others, all fall into the categories of these incidents as studied
by Dr. Feldman: hostage incidents, barricaded subjects without hostages, and barricaded
subjects who held hostages. Furthermore, additional relationships are established among
the first two hypotheses and the common factors described later in Dr. Feldman's study
when he lists, in table torm, the Sex and Race of Hostage/Barricade Subjects, Total
Weapons, Primary Weapons Used, Age Range, Location of Hostage/Barricade Incidents,
and so on (Feldman, 1996: tables).
Furthermore, with the idea of the HOBAS database kept in mind, it is clear that it
also lists information provided about these incidents. As with most research, a certain
amount of demographic information is collected. The Louisville database and the
HOBAS cover some of the same territory in that regard, and thus relate to the first two
hypotheses in that manner. Remember that the HOBAS, as part of the LLC, ". . .is a post-
incident data collection tool with the capability of providing empirical and statistical
data" (FBI pamphlet, 1998: 3).
Hypothesis number three states that as critical incidents occur in Georgia, review
of them will show that there is something different about them that warrants the label of
the Georgia factor. More succinctly, critical incidents in Georgia are different in some
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way than those that are measured across the United States. An example of this might be
how it is described near the end of the Literature Review that Inspector Ingram of the
GBI stated that the critical incidents in Georgia are perpetrated by white males age 35 or
over.
That is an interesting proposition, in any case, but is it true? As compared to the
national incidents, are the ones in Georgia committed by older white males than the
national average? Perhaps. In a broader sense, are the events of this nature in Georgia
different than their national counterparts? It was upon the asking of that question that the
third hvpothesis was constructed. Obviously, the GBI has a particular interest in the
Georgia factor.
Overall, the literature, either of the popular media or of professional or academic
research, indicates that all of these incidents are in some way(s) common.
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
Prior to describing the details in the subsections that follow, the general research
design is worthy of a few notes. The original intent of this project was to gather data,
using the HOBAS questionnaire, on all GBI SRT missions. While this was completed per
Inspector Ingram's early guidance, the number of questionnaires returned falls just short
of a quantity acceptable for genuine research and analysis. That is good, generally
speaking, because the larger argument is made that the less the SRT works, the better.
That means that fewer of these incidents are occurring.
This situation has created the dilemma, however, of deciding what to research.
The decision was made to use HOBAS statistics in comparison with the GBI returns, so
that some validity may be attached to the project. For additional purposes, the Louisville
22
database will u..o be cited to satisfy basic research and exploratory needs. Therefore, the
project centers on secondary data and the first phases of primary data from the GBI SRT
returns.
Research Method
Secondary data makes up most of the information analyzed in this project. The
FBI, during the early stages of the communication with the GBI about LEO and HOBAS,
provided various statistical reports from the HOBAS database. These reports are made up
of information from the questionnaires that were submitted to HOBAS from a variety of
law enforcement agencies in the United States and Canada. Remember fU it submissions
to HOBAS from 'Canada and Other' make up less than 1% of the total incidents in the
HOBAS database (Howard and Murphy, 1999: 9). Therefore, due to the negligible
amount those incidents, no attempt was made to separate those from the ones that
occurred throughout the United States.
The reports are presented as brief and clear documents that are easy to understand
and retrieve information from. The categories are listed in the sequence of the questions
on the questionnaire, therefore making the data retrieval process very efficient; especially
once familiarity with both documents was gained. Additionally, the HOBAS reports
come in sets of twos. One set has the actual breakdown of questionnaire responses in
actual numbers, and the other in percentages. Having both at ready disposal is
advantageous when specific data is desired.
The Louisville database is also a secondary data vehicle that provides insight into
these matters. The primary method used in Dr. Feldman's original research is offered for
reference purposes:
[Dr. Feldman] has served as a consultant to the hostage negotiation teams of the
Louisville Police Department, the Jefferson County (KY) Police Department, and
the Kentucky State Police. The former two departments serve a metropolitan area
of approximately 750,000 people, while the latter agency has jurisdiction state-
wide but responds to incidents in rural counties. Data were obtained from review
of police case files of hostage and barricade incidents occurring in the three juris-
dictions and from notes compiled during on-scene consultation at hostage/
barricade situations. Standardized case history forms were developed for each
incident (Feldman, 1996: 7).
The HOBAS questionnaire was used on incidents that the GBFs SRT responded
to. The questionnaire was not altered in any way as it was distributed to and/or
electronically delivered to GBI Special Agents who were familiar with specific SRT
missions. This distribution occurred on January 25, 1999. It coincided with the briefing
and training for the SAC's (Special Agent[s] in Charge) mentioned in the review of the
literature.
The questionnaire is a lengthy one, due in part to the details required by an
investigation into these matters. The questionnaire has 59 questions that cover four pages.
A fifth page is available for a summary of the incident so that the respondent may write
or type in additional information. It is also stated on page five that a copy of the incident
report or case file may be attached. Fixed-alternative answers are available for most of
the questions. However, the number of alternatives ranges from a few to 16. As a result,
actual completion of the questionnaire by the respondents was undoubtedly quite time
consuming. This length of time was compounded by answers that required specification
depending on the fixed alternative selected. There are also several questions that have a
"Other" option available when a particular answer was not listed among the fixed
alternatives. Those other responses were written in accordingly.
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Census
It is customary in research document formats for this section to be titled
Sampling. However, if a definition or type of sampling can be attached to the primary
data, the fact that all GBI SRT critical incidents were subjects of the research constitutes
a census (Fitzgerald and Cox, 1994: 71). The primary data was finite, and small in
number, and therefore studying every element involved in the research was accomplished
with ease.
It is theoretically possible that all future incidents could be studied in a similar
manner. The narrow scope of the project would provide for further analysis of every
event that qualifies as a critical incident that the GBI SRT responds to. Recall that since
the inception of the general research idea, the goal has been to analyze exactly these types
of events. As an addendum to the larger project, one of the goals of the research is to
evaluate attempted or commited suicides by perpetrators of the hostage and/or barricaded
gunmen incidents, with or without firearms. However, since the suicide angle is part of
the larger directive, it fell into place within the questionnaire and did not warrant special
attention herein. It is mentioned as an inclusion to this section so that it would be clear
that what was researched was, in no vague terms, predetermined. Hence the small amount
of primary data and the ability to conduct the research in the census form.
Additionally, a few notes about the secondary data are presented for review. Dr.
Feldman stated that his "[d]ata was obtained from review of police case files of hostage
and barricade incidents occurring in the three jurisdictions and from notes compiled
during on-scene consultation. . ." (Feldman, 1 996: 7). It would appear that Dr. Feldman
also conducted a census. The FBI's HOBAS database can said to be a collection point of
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information gathered from a census as well. The database comes from the submission of
their own completed questionnaires, which are limited in subject matter to the incidents
as defined.
Data Collection
Again, even though the total of the primary data did not prove to meet
fundamental research standards, the collection of it is detailed. Specific instructions were
provided with actual copies of the questionnaire that were distributed to the SACs in
January of 1999. A deadline of the end of February was provided for returns. For those
GBI field offices that did not receive questionnaires, copies were provided via fax one
week after original distribution. All offices were contacted during that week to see if
there were any problems with the questionnaire. Part of the intent of the briefing and the
distribution of the GBI's research literature was to set the stage for questionnaire
completion. As a result, data collection was quite simple. In effect, some training on the
questionnaire was provided to the respondents before the questionnaire was distributed.
The questionnaires were to be returned to the GBI Training and DARE Unit by fax, or,
preferably, by US Mail.
Questionnaires were returned in the mail almost immediately. They were initially
scanned by GBI Special Agent Keith Howard to see if they were complete. If r o, they
were collected in a designated location in the office of the GBI Training unit in Forsyth,
Georgia. There were some questionnaires that were not complete, and these were
separated and flagged for follow-up at a later date.
At least once weekly during March of 1999, the author personally read and
reviewed each returned questionnaire for completion and accuracy. Most questionnaires
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were returned within the designated time frame, but others came in sporadically
throughout the spring of 1999.
There were some open-ended options to some questions, and these required
clarification. Upon the realization of this, phone calls were made to each of the
respondents in order to clarify blank or unclear responses. The questionnaire does
provide the respondents with the opportunity to list their name and contact information.
In inst n ces where this information was omitted, phone calls were made to the GBI office
in the region where the questionnaire was completed, based on where the original
incident occurred. Reminding office SACs or assistant SACs of the questionnaire always
led to rapid discovery of the actual respondent.
It is important to factor in the aspect of memory to questionnaire completion. The
HOBAS questionnaire asks for very specific information on a variety of categories and
subcategories that an SRT member may not readily recall, if they were ever familiar with
those details to start with. This affected questionnaire completion and accuracy. Case
files, either the GBI's or the local (the jurisdiction where the original incident occurred)
agency's, were attached to some of the questionnaires when available. It can be argued
that a case file or report on the incident can jog one's memory, but it can also be argued
that a report may not include information that HOBAS is looking for.
Tabulation and Analysis
Upon completion of all questionnaires by the respondents in the summer of 1999,
data collection was obtained through the simple method of counting responses to the
individual questions. Bear in mind the small number of returns. The only difficulty with
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this process was the determination of what type of incident each completed questionnaire
qualified as.
As described in the previous section, the questionnaires were briefly scanned for
accuracy immediately upon receipt. They were examined in deeper detail upon complete
study of the questionnaires during the summer and fall of 1999. Accuracy was checked
again during these readings.
No coding of answers was required during the manual tabulation phases of data
analysis. The small amount of primary data did not require electronic tabulation or
tracking in any way, shape, or form. At best, during table and graph construction, a
calculator was used on occasion to double check math that was done mentally or with
pencil and paper.
The secondary data has been previously collected, by nature of definition. Both
Dr. Feldman's and the HOBAS statistical reports included raw numbers and percentages.
Toward the end of this paper, simple comparisons are made with all three sources of data.
RESULTS
The heart of any research endeavor is results. For ease of understanding, the
results of the primary data will be presented along with the larger results as provided by
the HOBAS statistical reports. While this is occurring, the results will be shown in actual
numbers most of the time. Percentages will be used only during occasions where the
e.\pression of data in that matter is of critical importance.
Additionally, the primary data as it is listed in the following sections is often not
totaled. In an effort to reduce the discussion of the results, the often unanswered
questions from the primary data were omitted. The continuous notations of what was
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answered and what was not would be self-defeating and repetitive. "Unknown's and
"Other's are included in the discussion of the results only as they are pertinent to the
question at hand.
Bear in mind that the primary data is listed and carefully described as a precept
for others who embark on similar research. The main recipient and user of the primary
data is the GBI. As of April 2000, guidance was provided to the author that the GBI fully
intends to continue the research initiated by this project. Part of the design of this
anproach is to also leave this project open for further work and enhancements, either by
the GBI or the author.
The Louisville database will be discussed last, but in a comparative manner. This
tactic is employed because the Louisville database has some of the same information as
the HOBAS and some information that is different than the HOBAS. Not all of the
secondary information from the Louisville database will be used. Although worthy of
standing alone, only relevant information from Dr. Feldman's project will be related to
the HOBAS and GBI data.
The reader will note in the following sections that some text is in a different font
and size. This was done so that it will be perfectly clear as to the exact wording of the
questionnaire without the need to check it.
From the primary data, 24 of the 32 questionnaires returned were determined to
be usable. That is to say that those questionnaires met the basic incident qualifications as
defined shortly. There were 1,828 incidents on record according to the HOBAS statistical
reports issued in late June of 1999. Dr. Feldman studied 120 hostage and barricade
incidents.
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rhe results as described in text form make up the largest amount of material in
this document. Some questions were not factored into the data pertinent to this studv, and
these omissions are explained.
Questionnaire
Without further adieu, the results, by question and in sequence, are presented after
a copy of the actual questionnaire. Due to the cluttered arrangement of questions and
answer options on the questionnaire, an annotated copy is not provided. In the interest of
maintaining authenticity, the questionnaire pages are not numbered.
Return to
FBI Academy
Crisis Negotiation Unit, Bldg 9
QuanUco, VA 22135
Phone: (703)632-1496
FAX: (703)632-1474
FBI INCIDENT #
M = MANDATORY ENTRY
FD-522 (Rev 00-00-00)
(03/03/99)
Agency Name:
Address:
Phone
City:
Slate/Province
Prepared by
Zip: Country:
(Pnnt) Last First
Date of report: / / (mm/dd/yyyy)
Law Enforcement Serial #
Ml
SECTION A: INCIDENT
Type: (Select one) M
D Attempted Suicide
H Suicide
Combination
D Barricade'
D Hostage 2
2. Was the incident:
Planned
Unplanned
3 Date/Ttrr M
(mm/dd/ - Time (24-hour clock)
Start:
(mm/dd/yyyy) ime
End
(mm/dd/yyyy) Time
4 Location: (Select one) M
Apartment/Condominium
Automobile
Barn/Out Building
D Pnson/Jail
D Mobile Home
Office/Workplace
Hotel/Motel
D Private Resident/Farmhouse
Public Transportation
D Government/Public Building
D Other: (Specify)
Violence occurred: (Select all that apply) 6 Violence occurred against whom:
Onset
During
D Demand/Deadline
Surrender/Conclusion
Against Law Enforcement Officer
Against Random Hostage/Victim
D Against Selected Hostage/Victim
7. Was religion a factor in this incident 7
D Yes
D No
SECTION B: NATURE OF CONTACTS
8 Communication with subject initiated by: (Select all that apply) 9. Method of communication: (Select all that apply) M
Employee
Family Member
D Law Enforcement
D First Responder
Negotiator
Spouse/Ex-Spouse
Significant Other
Health Care Professional
D Crisis Hot Line
Neighbor
D Social Worker
D Victim
Witness/Passer By
Friend
Other: (Specify)
Bullhorn/PA
Existing Phone Service
D Exposed Face-to-Face
D Hostage Phone
D Cell Phone
D Voice Contact from Cover
Radio/Internal Intercom
Internet (i.e. chat room)
D Written
Robot
D No Communication
D Other: (Specify)
10. Were Third Party Intermediaries (TPI) used? M
Yes
D No
12. The TPI: (Selecl one)
D Helped
Did not help
11. Type of TPI used: (Select all that apply)
Clergy: (Specify type of Religion)
D Family Member: (Specify relationship^
Friend: (Specify type)
Mental Health Consultant: (Specify)_
Public Official: (Specify)
Attorney: (Specify type)
D Media: (Specify)
D Other: (Specify)
13. Was a mental health consultant used dunng incident? M
D Yes D No
1 Bamcade Incident A person(s) refusing lo come out from a fortified position or release a victim where there is no substantive demand Emotional venting predominates over
achieving a clearty identified goal 2 Hostage Incident: A person(s) held against their will and me captor has made a substantive demand It is a goal-onenteo madeni
HOSTAGE/BARRICAUh KLHUKi
SECTION C RESOLUTION
,. Resoiution based on: M « ^ >"«*- »*?
' 6^ """ '""
Q Negotiation/Sender,Go ,0 Question ,8, O DeNberate assault 7n7n7d77y^~ 7^7
D Comb,nat,on negotiation/tactical
Emergency Assault
D Tactical/Intervention P °'"=' (SP^W ——
-
_
,
- . •
, D Overtaken by HoslageA/ictim(s)D Suicide/Attempted Suicide ^ w T
_ D Sniper ShotD Escape .
D "Suicide by Cop
,
• lartirai ariion Q Less than lethal means (Select allthat apply)
17 Neqotia inq team role in tactical ct .
I-J
y y
,
v D Rubber Bullets Net
(Select all,ha, apply)
Pressure Hose D Bean Bags
aD,VerS '° n
m np,i.erv D Chemical Agent O CanineD False Concess.ons/Bogus Del.v y D No Assau.,
D Stalled for time for tactical preparation
lj siun ^u
,_,,,.„ D Other (Specify)
D Set-Up Sublet for Resolution
l-J K
D Not Used
• a oien ranture this data in your answer to question 44 - Status
of S ubject.
.
If the Subjed committed suicde also p *gLUj~ - ^ |nc|QENT
, nM 19 Deattr (Select all that apply) M 20 Was there significant property
,8 In.unes to: (Select all that apply) M nTstanders dama 9e?
D Bystanders n Yp c;
_
'
,
,
D Law Enforcement u resD Law Enforcement rj N
D None D None
,. Explain in narrative
Explain in narrative Subject/Victim status recorded later
Subject/Victim status recorded later a D,au
, ,^ irs . 22 Number of negotiators on scene _
21 Negotiations conducted in.
D English
Q Spanish
D Other Language
nterpreterUsed: D Yes D No
SECTION E: ANCILLARY INFORMATION (OPTIONAL)
23 Does the agency have a trained negotiation
team?
24 Does the agency have a mental health professional
assigned?
25 Does the agency have a dedicated tactical
team?
25 Does the negotiation team/negotiator(s)
regularly train with SWAT?
27 Does incident commander participate regularly in
negotiation/SWAT training?
D Yes No
Yes No
O Yes O No
Yes No
g yes No
page 2
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SECTION F: SUBJECT DATA
Sub|ect Number
28 Subject: M 29. Age
30. Sex: D Female D Male
(Letter Reference) (Whole years)
31 Marital Status: D Single D Marned D Separated D Divorced
32 Race M 33 English
language fluency:
g B |ack D White (Select one)
D Asian/Pacific Islander D Hispanic Fluent in English
D Native Amencan Other: (Specify) D Other: (Specify)
D Widow/Widower Cohabitation
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35 Education Level: (Select highest
Dropout
D High School Graduate
D Some College
D College Graduate
D Trade School
>vel) M
Criminal History M
(Select all that apply)
None
D Unknov."
D Prior Charges:
Hostage/Barricade
Other Crime (Specify),
D Violent
Substance abuse history:
(Select all that apply)
D Alcohol
Controlled Dangerous Substance:
(Specify)
_
D List Non-Prescription:
(Specify),
D List Prescription:
(Specify)
Unknown
D None
Weapons used in this incident: M
(Select all that apply)
Yes
Blunt Object
Chemical
D Handgun
D Knife
Shoulder Weapon
D Other: (Specify)
No
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36. Military Experience:
(Select one) M
D Prior
Present
None
Unknown
38. Prior suicide attempts
(Select one)
D Unknown
D None
One or more
(Select all that apply)
Firearm
D Overdose
D Jumper
D Cutting Instrument
Substance used in this
incident: (Select all that apply)
D Alcohol
Controlled Dangerous Substance:
(Specify)
.
List Non-Prescription:
(Specify)
.
D List Prescription:
(Specify)
Unknown
None
44. Restraining order on this subject:
(Select one)
Existing
Prior
None
a no34. Employment: D Yes
(Select all that apply)
Education D Management
D Government
_
Retired
riomemaker D Student
Law Enforcement D Laborer
Professional/Technical
Self Employed/Business Owner
D Tradesman/Machine Operalor
Other: (Specify)
39 Mental health problems M
(Select all tha' ipply)
Committed in Past to State Mental
Health Facility: (Select all that apply)
D Inpatient Outpatient
No Known Current Problems
No Known Prior(s)
Other: (Specify)
D Receiving Counseling/Therapy
Resident Treatment Facility
42. Explosives used in this incident M
D Yes
(Describe Device and Type of Explosive)
D No
45. Status of Subject: (Select one) M
Suicide
D Injured
D Killed (Select if applies)
Suicide by Cop
D No Injury
NOTES- » *ere were multiple subject Invotved In me incident, copy mis page
and fill in me data (or each subject Be sure ,ha. each sub,ec, has an a 3S
,gned
sequential letter, e.g. A, B. C. etc On each additional page include: ^ ^^ repoft_,_,_
Agency name: -—
-
page 3
HOSTAGE/BARRICADE REPORT
SECTION G: HOSTAGE/VICTIM DATA
If no hostage taken or victim held - explain in
narrative
46 Hostage/Victim: M
47. Age
(Letter Reference)
49 Race: M
Black
D Asian/Pacific Islander
D Native American
D White
Hispanic
(Whole years)
50 English language fluency
(Select one)
Fluent in English
Other- (Specify) Other (Specify)
M52 Hostage/Victim mobility
(Select all that apply)
D Allowed Free Movement
Movement Restricted
D Restrained Physically
D Isolated
53. Did the victim's mobility
Improve during the incident 7 M
D Yes
No
M
54 Hostage/Victim survival information:
(Select all that apply)
Stockholm Syndrome
D Negative Feelings Toward Law Enforcement
Positive Feelings Toward Subject
D Sub)ect has Returned Positive feelings
Toward HostageA/ictim
Not a factor
57 HostageA/ictim release: (Select one)
D Released at Time of Negotiated Surrender
D Released Prior to Resolution of Incident: (Select one)
Negotiated Release
D Non-Negotiated Release
D Due to Health Factors
D Rescued by Tactical Team
Hostage Number_
48 Sex. D Female Male
HostageA/ictim treatment M
(Select all that apply)
Verbally Abused
D Physically Abused
D Sexually Abused
D Ignored
D Not Mistreated
Talked Freely with Subject(s)
D Other. (Specify)_
55 Was subject positively Influenced
by hostage/victim(s) 7 M
D Yes
D No
56 Relationship lo Subject
(Select all that apply)
D Employer
Family Member
D Friend/Co-worker
G Law Enforcement
D None
D Other
(Specify),
D Spouse/Ex-Spouse
D Significant Other
58 Status of hostage/victim at end of incident
(Select one) M
No Injury
D Injured
Deceased (Select one)
D Killed by subject
D Died: (Specify)
59. Did subject allow this hostage/victim to talk to
law enforcement 7 M
60 Did subject talk to law enforcement through
this hostage/viclim 7
DYes No
Q Yes No
,rare, „««. «*.—— *-«-«--- - *-- *-
—
'
B*
~
~ "*
"*
"" "
""""
serial letter, e.g. A. B. C. etc On each additional page
indude.
Agency name: ,
Dale of the report I '
—
page 4
HOSTAGE/BARRICADE REPORT
SECTION H: NARRATIVE M
Print, type, or attach p lice incident summery
(ATTACH ADDITIONAL PAGES IF NECESSARY)
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For clarity, the first question on the questionnaire was Type under Section a incident.
The answer options were, in order, Attempted Suicide. Barricade*, Hostage*, and Suicide. The
asterisks refer to a brief explanation of the terms found at the bottom of the first page of
the questionnaire, as follows:
Barricade incident: A person(s) refusing to come out from a fortified position or release a victim where there is
no substantive demand.
Emotional venting predominates over achieving a clearly identified goal.
Hostage incident: A person(s) held against their will and the captor has made a substantive demand. It is goal
oriented.
It was the responses to the choices that determined if all reported incidents were
nlicable to the project. As far as the primary data was concerned, some respondents
claimed that a particular incident involved more than one of the available options, which
was determined to be quite adequate; in that any given situation may be a combination of
any of the answers. Refer to the chart on the following page titled "Types of Incidents."
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Types of Incidents
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Incident Type
Barricade H Attempted Suicide Hostage Suicide
Obviously, Barricade incidents were the ones most reported by the GBI. On the
Statistical Report of Incidents provided from the FBI, the numbers are somewhat larger.
Their data for Incident Type is as follows:
Hostage:
Barricade:
Suicide:
Att. [Attemptedl Suicide
Number of Incidents
222
1,082
196
328
1,828
Two things are important to note here. First, the number of incidents (1,828) in
the FBI's reports is shown in this table so that it is clear that the numbers of individual
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incidents add up to the number of total incidents. There will be occasions within this text
when the total of the individual raw numbers does not add up to the total number of
incidents. Relevant notations are made. Otherwise, the absence of either total indicates
that the individual factors add up to the total number of incidents, regardless of how
expressed.
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the actual questionnaires submitted to
the federal HOBAS are not available for review. Therefore, according to the smaller
number of incident types from the Georgia statistics, multiple responses submitted to the
FBI are not known. However, the FBI does state that ". . .data collected for the HOBAS
database is processed to eliminate ambiguous information before being entered" (FBI
pamphlet, 1998: 4). Their judgement and procedures were not called into question.
Now back to the point at hand: incident type. In Georgia, m t of the incidents
were of the barricade and hostage nature. At the federal level, most of the incidents were
also of the barricade (59.2%) and hostage (12.1%) nature. It is this type of correlation that
we will be looking for from now on.
Question two asks if the incident was planned or not. There were two omissions
to this question from the GBI, and 94 'unknowns' according to the HOBAS statistics. In
Georgia, 13 were unplanned, eight were planned, and three were unknown. Those
compare to 1,287 unplanned and 447 planned according to the HOBAS.
Question three refers to the dates and times of the incidents. Blanks are offered on
the questionnaire for starting and ending times. A brief review of the dates and times was
conducted on the primary data during careful examination of the questionnaires in the fall
of 1999. No correlations or relationships could be established, therefore this question is
considered moot. Additionally, the Time of Day on the HOBAS report shows a fairly
even distribution of start and end times. No noteworthy relationship involving time and
its influence on the incidents or perpetrators exists.
Question four has four answers for location. The jurisdiction, city, or county
where the incident occurred is not the issue. The nearly exact type of location is. The
question is presented, as well as the primary and HOBAS answers, in that order.
4. Location: (Select one)
Apartment/Condominium 1/382
Automobile 0/45
Barn/Out Building 0/9
Prison/Jail 0/0
Mobile Home 9/79
Office/Workplace 0/58
"-ivate Residence/Farmhouse 10/965
jblic Transportation 0/1
Government/Public Building 0/0
Other (Specify) 4/289
Again, a correlation jumps out at the reader and the researcher. Most of the
critical incidents that occur nationwide and in Georgia take place a -rivate residences,
which include farmhouses. So far, so good. The primary data is consistent with the
national statistics. Maintaining those consistencies and pointing out any discrepancies are
part of the research objectives.
Continuing On, question five requests answers tO Violence occurred: (Select all that apply).
This is a question worthy of close inspection. The answers and their frequency, in the
same way as above, are presented.
Onset 13/853
During 11/418
Demand/Deadline 3/185
Surrender/Conclusion 10/207
These critical incidents are violent, which is the main point. However, there was more
violence per incident (determined by simple math) reported in Geoi\ a than there was at
the federal level. Regrettably, this cannot be statistically proven due to the large
difference between the primary numbers and the secondary numbers.
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Question six is a follow-up to question five. The concern is with to whom the
violence occurred. One answer was not given in the primary data. The answer option and
results are similarly shown:
Against Lav. Enforcement Officer 13/501
Against p -.ndom HostageA/ictim 1/122
Against Selected HostageA/ictim 9/556
Question seven pertains to religion as a factor in the incidents. Twenty-two "No"
answers were reported in the primary data. The HOBAS statistical reports list this data, in
several subcategories, but relevancy is not seen.
The next section on the ouestionnaire is titled Nature of Contacts. Individuals who may
be interested in this section more than others might include hostage negotiators and those
who train, assist, or work with them.
Question number eight pertains to communication initiation with the subject, by a
number of choices. Overwhelmingly, law enforcement officers were the first to
communicate with the perpetrators of these incidents. Similar correlations are seen
between the primary data and the secondary data again. At the federal level, 1,314 law
enforcement officers reportedly made the first contact with the subject(s). The next
closest group was family members, and there were 271 of those. In Georgia, the
respondents reported that 22 law enforcement officers made the first contact, with five
family members making the first contact. There were several multiple answers to this
question in the primary data.
Question nine is another question that allows for multiple answers and has a very
specific area of interest. The concern is the method of communication, based on the type
of equipment or style used to conduct the communication. The equipment or style is
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listed in sequence in the following columns, with the item at the top of each list being the
most used.
Georgia
Exposed face to face
Cellular phone
Existing phone service
Bullhorn
Voice contact from cover
HOBAS
Existing phone service
Voice contact from cover
Bullhorn
Exposed face to face
Hostage Phone
This was another multiple answer question. The differences are clear, but only
summations should be made. There are a number of possible explanations for the
differences, but more research is needed prior to analysis of this phenomenon at that
level.
Question ten concerns the use of TPIs (Third-Party Intermediaries). The term is
self explanatory, and they are largely not used in critical incidents according to both the
primary and secondary data (16 "no's" in primary, 1,510 "no's" in the secondary). When
they are used, they are largely ineffective and are family members more often than not
(questions 1 1 and 12, inversely). Of the types of TPIs reported, five out of eight were
family members in Georgia and there were five "did not help" answers to the question. At
the federal level, there were 157 family members out of 347 TPIs, and more responses
that the TPI did not change the situation, or made it worse, than positive responses such
as surrender, lowered emotions, etc. These details about the effectiveness of TPIs are not
meant to construe that family members of perpetrators had no positive effect during these
incidents. The lack of actual questionnaires submitted to the HOBAS prevents a detailed
analysis of this subject.
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Mental health consultation (question 13) is another area where the primary and
secondary information agree. The answer "no" occurred 23 times in Georgia, and was
reported 1,473 times on the HOBAS.
Page two of the questionnaire begins with Section C, which is titled Resolution. The
FBI HOBAS reports do not provide numbers and percentages for every question. Rather,
they provide data on categories of questions, which explains the differences in the tables
below. The similarities should be apparent though.
The first question in this section, number 14, pertains to resolution. The primary
data is as follows:
Negotiation/Surrender 6
Tactical/lntervent'on 7
Combination negotiation/tactical 6
Suicide/Attempted Suicide 3
Three answers to this question were written in. Those consisted of two responses of
"escaped" and one "fell asleep." One questionnaire had two responses to this question.
The HOBAS database shows the following about resolution, represented as it
appears in the Statistical Report of Incidents:
Resolution By
Negotiations Only 1,035
Comb. Negot/Tact. Act. 578
Tactical Action Only 155
Negotiation after Tactical Act. 7
Resolution Unknown 53
There may be a variety of reasons why there are 53 occurrences of Resolution Unknown.
Details about multiple answers or unknowns are not provided with the HOBAS statistics.
Question 15 refers to tactical action, although the HOBAS statistics have
Negotiations Only as an answer in this category, even though it is not a choice on the
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questionnaire. Fortunately, it is the answer with the most responses ( 1 .035). A clear
breakdown of the primary and secondary answers is offered:
Deliberate Assault 8/326
Emergency Assault 3/83
Other (specify) 3/220
Overtaken by Hostage/Victim(s) 0/3
Sniper Shot 0/7
"Suicide by Cop" 1/4
Less than lethal means 8/150
Question 16 asks what date and time the tactical action was initiated. This is
another moot point in this project.
Question 17 is another one that may be of special interest to hostage negotiators
and personnel in similar roles. The role of the negotiation team in the tactical action is the
point here, and multiple answers were allowed \ccording to the primary data, the
negotiators provided one diversion, four set-ups of the subject for resolution, and stalled
for time for tactical preparation on six occasions. At the federal level, the occurrences of
negotiator participation in each of these areas were almost evenly distributed. In the same
sequence as above, the numbers from the HOBAS are 137, 96, and 101. Furthermore,
false concessions were communicated to the subject 14 times, and there were 124 'other'
uses of the negotiators in tactical interventions. The HOBAS also states that there were
121 non-answers to this question.
The next section of the questionnaire is titled post incident. The first two
questions, 18 and 19, cover injuries and death, in that order. However, the HOBAS
presents a table that has been translated to chart form for simplicity of data review. The
table in the HOBAS (and the chart below) covers the above questions as well as numbers
44 and 57 on the questionnaire. The primary data and secondary data are indicated by (P)
and (S), as appropriate.
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Property damage is the subject of question 20. Primary property damage was
reported six times out of 24, and HOBAS answers were 1,473 in the negative, 178 in the
positive, and 177 ttUnknown"s.
English is the primary language used in these incidents (question 21), making up
most of the federal answers and all of the answers in Georgia. HOBAS answers and
distribution were English, 1,288, Spanish, 25, Other, 23, and Unknown at 492.
The number of negotiators on scene (question 22) is a neglected question. Only 13
answers were received in the primary data, and the answer is not even offered in the
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HOBAS statistics with the exception of Total Used Tactically (379), which is found
under the Tactical Use of Negotiators subcategory. Nonetheless, according to the primary
data respondents' answers, there was only one negotiator on the scene most of the time
(seven answers). Two negotiators were on the scene of the incident twice, three three
times, and five negotiators worked one incident.
Section E on the questionnaire is optional. It is titled ancillary information. A
brief digression from results is warranted here. In the Literature Review, an article from
the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin is cited in a discussion about the history (or lack
thereof) of a "central clearinghouse" of information about critical incidents and the
professionals involved in responding to them. In the article, there are sections titled
"Negotiation Team Selection and Training" and "Use of Mental Health Professionals."
Within the first section is the quote "Overall, little or no joint training was undertaken
with SWAT teams" (Hammer, et al, 1994: 2). This is brought up here because of the
following questions, listed verbatim from the questionnaire:
23 Does the agency have a trained negotiation team? Yes No
24. Does the agency have a mental health professional assigned? Yes No
25 Does the agency have a dedicated tactical team? Yes No
26. Does the negotiation team/negotiator(s) regularly train with SWAT? Yes No
Due to the similarities between these questions and the quotes, and the points illustrated
in the literature review, further credibility is given to the theory that the HOBAS dates
back to the early research as indicated. Additionally, these questions are presented as
options, and do not have their own listing on the HOBA c statistical reports. The use of
these questions as part of a long-term study into these matters could not be confirmed. It
is reassuring though to believe that this is the case. The primary data is supplied.
23. Yes 21 No 1 25. Yes 21 No 19
24. Yes 2 No 9 26. Yes 15 No 7
10
Section F of the questionnaire consists of information about the perpetrators of
these incidents. The total numbers in this section on the HOBAS ha . j increased by 64.
Apparently, there were a few more perpetrators than there were incidents.
Question 27 is omitted here due to privacy reasons. The names of the individuals
involved have no bearing on this study.
Question 28 pertains to the ages of the perpetrators. The age brackets below were
chosen because they are listed that way in the HOBAS report. The table below is
provided for the purpose of reviewing the actual numbers.
Georgia HOBAS
Under 18 64
18-29 554
30-45 848
46-65 247
Over 65 30
Unknown 149
One of the larger research objectives, which is applicable to interested parties
within the GBI, is to compare the Georgia statistics with the HOBAS in a side-by-side
manner (remember hypothesis number three). Thus, the chart below. The data values
represent percentages, and the chart is actually two charts in one. The Georgia age
categories are on the left, while the federal age categories are on the right. In taking
some liberty with the results, it is interesting to note that the 46-65 years old age category
in Georgia is over twice it's federal counterpart. Until additional primary research is
conducted, however, the supposition that perpetrators in Georgia are older than the
national mode is not valid.
Under 18
18-29 5
30-45 10
46-65 7
Over 65
Unknown 2
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Subject Age Groups (% of total subjects)
Under 18 18-29 30-45 46-65 Over 65 link. Under 18 18-29 30-45 46-65 Over 65 Unk
Georgia Bureau of Investigation Federal Bureau of Investigation
Questions 29, 30, and 31 are similarly demographic in nature. In order, these
questions cover gender, marital status, and race. The distribution of primary answers and
HOBAS statistics is presented.
Georgia HOBAS
Gender
Male all
Female
Unknown
Marital Status
Married 10
Divorced 2
Separated
Single 8
Unknown 4
Race
Native American
African American 4
1,672
174
46
463
185
143
722
388
(1901 this category,
see below)
55
369
42
Asian/Pacific Island 41
White/Hispanic 19 1,204
Other 192
Unknown 1 3
1
It is not known why the total under the category of Marital Status on the HOBAS
side is different than the total number of subjects (1,892). The initial train of thought on
this matter, after much exposure to the primary questionnaires, is that multiple answers
were given upon initial questionnaire completion. This would be applicable to the Marital
Status category, especially since some of the choices could be considered one situation.
An example of this would be if a subject was legally married but separated from his or
her spouse. At tabulation, these separate answers would be counted as such. The issue of
diminishing returns may come to mind at this point, especially if one is only studying the
HOBAS statistics on a percentage basis. That is a valid matter, but would not apply if
studies of this matter were conducted over time.
In any event, like other categories, these demographics offer a snapshot of the
subjects who are perpetrators of critical incidents. A quick scan of the tables above
indicates that most of the critical incident offenders are single, white males. Seasoned
professionals in law enforcement and/or hostage negotiators could probably indicate as
much when asked the question of "Who?", but now those answers can be backed up with
some credibility. Moreover, the Georgia numbers match the HOBAS as far as this
classification of perpetrators is concerned.
Continuing on with offender characteristics, English language fluency (question 32) is
worth mentioning, albeit briefly. All of the offenders in Georgia spoke and understood
English. An overwhelming majority of the HOBAS offenders were fluent in English.
This tells people involved in these incidents that they probably will not need an
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interpreter. Only 50 of the offenders within the HOBAS numbers did not understand
English fully. Unknown responses therein numbered 230.
Employment, number 33 on the questionnaire, was not addressed by the HOBAS
database. In Georgia, there were nine positive responses, ten negative responses, and five
unknowns.
Another surprising omission on the HOBAS database is the absence of question
34 on the questionnaire, which deals with the education level of the subjects. The primary
data revealed that there were seven high school graduates, one college graduate, and two
high school dropouts. l f is not known what the education levels of the remaining fourteen
subjects were.
Military background (number 35) was not listed in the HOBAS report. Less than
half (eight) of the perpetrators in Georgia had current or prior service. It was reported that
eight had no experience, which leaves eight unknowns.
In law enforcement circles, the issue of whether not an individual has a prior
history of criminal activity is nearly paramount in investigations from the street level to
the international level. This is question 36. Percentages from the HOBAS database are
used here to rapidly indicate that slightly over half of the perpetrators (50.1%) have a
criminal background. The HOBAS states that 34% of the subjects had an unknown
criminal history, 18% had none, 26.1% had a history including violent crime, and an
alarming 3.9% of the subjects had a history of previous hostage and/or barricade
activities! "Other Crimes" constituted 20.1%. The total percentage is 102.1%. This
question was one of many in the HOBAS database where multiple answers were
accepted. As far as the primary data is concerned, there were 17 responses that indicated
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that the subjects had some type of past criminal involvement. Of those, there was one
report of previous hostage and/or barricade involvement. There were nine instances
where the criminal in story was unknown, and there were two negative responses. Again,
multiple responses occurred.
Some of the subjects who committed these incident^ had previous experience
pursuing suicide. However, the answers to question 37 in the primary data included 1
7
"Unknown"s. Within the HOBAS, there were over 1,600 unknown or no known prior
suicide attempt answers. The lack of knowledge one way or the other negates the
question.
Some of the subjects also had mental health problems. A table for the responses to
question 38 is presented for clarity and quick review. Obviously, the HOBAS numbers
are the larger ones. From the primary data, a
total of 23 responses were provided for this
question. Even though that total is almost
24, multiple answers were provided on some
38. Mental health problems: M
(Select all that apply)
Committed in past to state mental
health facility
No known current problems
No prior
Other: (Specify)
Receiving counseling/therapy
Resident treatment facility
of the questionnaires. One answer of "paranoid-schizophrenic" was written in on one of
the GBI questionnaires. The breakdown of respondent reported Mental health problems is:
Committed in past to state mental health facility 6/172
No known current problems 7/733
No prior 2/418
Other: (Specify) 3/333
Receiving counseling/therapy 4/27"
Resident treatment facility 1/27-
Multiple answers were also allowed for this question. The HOBAS total of the responses
is 1,983.
Substance abuse history is another matter entirely. The secondary data will be
discussed momentarily. In the primary data, there were 39 positive responses to questions
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39 and 40, which address the history of subject substance use and the use of substances
during the incident, if any.
For illustrative purposes, the substance abuse and use as addressed on the
questionnaires is presented, with numerical representations included for the reported
users/abusers from the primary data.
39. Substance abuse history: 40. Substance used in this
(Select all that apply) incident: (Select all that apply)
13 Alcohol 10 Alcohol
7 Controlled dangerous substance: 4 Controlled dangerous substance:
(Specify) (Specify)
List non-prescription: 1 List non-prescription:
(Specify) (Specify)
2 List prescription:2 List prescription:
(Specify) (Specify)
9 Unknown 9 Unknown
1 None 2 None
What is interesting to note about questions 39 and 40 is that there were only three
responses to the None option, which indicates that it was not known for certain in most of
the incidents if the perpetrator was "clean" and/or sober. Therefore, the accuracy of the
unknown responses should be questioned, and it may be postulated that some of the answers
about substance use/abuse are skewed because real information is frequei. v not readily
accessible or available to the respondents.
In addition to alcohol, the following substances were written in to both questions
when respondents were asked to be specific about substance type: marijuana (two times),
Prozac, Tylenol, "crack" cocaine (two times), methamphetamines (two times), and
"Unknown". Prozac and Soma were written in as prescribed medications being used prior
to and during an incident, respectively.
This is another occasion when percentages from the HOBAS database are mor
appropriate than raw numbers. Refer to the table below.
46
History of Use Use during Incident
None 5.7% 5.0%
Controlled dangerous siibstance 12.3 8.5
Prescription 2.3 4.3
Non-prescription 2.9 1.8
Alcohol 24.4 32.9
Other 1.9 1.0
Unknown 59.5 53.2
Again, multiple answers were accepted. Note the high percentage of "Unknown's.
Question 41 is of particular interest to law enforcement first responders, SWAT
teams, and others that may be on the scene during these incidents. Explosive use during
critical incidents, according to the HOBAS, numbered 88. There were three reports of
explosive use from the primary data, and the exact explosives used were reported as one
grenade, one instance of ignited gasoline, and one incident involved the use of gasoline
and dynamite.
Question number 42 is also critical to the same audience of question 41 . Multiple
answers were permitted. Weapons - of some type
or another - were used in the majority of all of
the incidents. Fully 1,746 positive responses were
42. Weapons used in this incident: M
(Select all that apply)
23/1,746 Yes
2/262 Knife
7/740 Handgun
15/511 Shoulder Weapon
4/233 Other
1/390 No
given according to HOBAS, and 22 out of 24 incidents in the primary data included
weapon use. Among the weapons in the "Other" category, chemicals were used on at
least one occasion and a baseball bat on another.
The last question in the subject data portion of the questionnaire is about the
presence of restraining orders on the subject. The high number of negative and
"Unknown" responses to the question (1,781 collective^ dictates that the issue be
dropped from further discussion and research in this project.
47
Section G on the questionnaire is titled hostage/victim data. According to the
HOBAS, there were 555 victims. In Georgia, there were 15. Once more, the first question
in this section is omitted for privacy reasons. The next few questions are demographic in
nature, much like the beginning of the previous section, and are summarized in the chart
below and the tables on the next page.
Age of Victims
Primary Secondary
Under 18 18-29 30-45 46-65
Age Categories
Over 65 Unknown
IS
Georgia
Gender
Male 7
Female 8
Unknown
Marital Status
Married N/A
Divorced "
Separated II
Single II
Unknown II
Race
Native American 1
African American 1
Asian/Pacific Island
White/Hispanic 13
Other
Unknown
HOBAS
175
374
6
127
28
23
235
142
22
118
27
337
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In keeping with the pursuit of analysis of critical incidents based on the statistics,
the above charts and tables may lead to a generalization that single, white females of
early and middle adulthood are most often victimized by the perpetrators.
The rest of the results from the questionnaire are reported on a question-by-
question basis. After all, this project is primarily concerned with the characteristics of the
perpetrators and the incidents, not the victims and the incidents. The term "victims" is
inclusive of those who were held hostage and/or were somehow victimized during the
course of the crisis. Also, due to the smaller number of victims, in both sets of data, a
detailed presentation of the results is not warranted.
So far, in the above tables and graphs, demographics have been covered. That
information entails the responses from questions 46, 47, and 48. English fluency is the
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subject of question 49, and involves no investigation because non-English fluency is not a
factor.
Question 50 asks for the respondents to list Health factors. There were three physical
injuries during the incident reported in the primary data, and 34 in the secondary data.
The other optional answers, none of which were answered in Georgia, are listed as
follows (with distribution): Coronary (13), Diabetic (two), Mental Condition (7), Other (37), Unknown (55), and
No Known Problems (423). The total for these health factors in the secondary data, including the
injuries that were sustained during the incident, is 605. Apparently, some of the factors as
reported occurred during the same incident.
Question 51, and it's distribution of answers
(primary/secondary), is shown. As indicated in
the box, there were 83 "Other"s reported in the
secondary data. Both sets of numbers, when
51. Hostage/Victim treatment: M
1/20 Ignored
2/171 Not mistreated
4/83 Other: (Specify)
4/125 Physically abused
1/26 Sexually abused
1/66 Talked freely with subject(s)
4/1 14 Verbally abused
added together, exceed the total number of victims reported.
Victim mobility, question 52, has three choices. They are Allowed free movement,
Guarded by: [respondent reports who], and Restrained. In the primary data, no freedom of
movement was reported. There were seven answers to Guarded by:, with the subject written
in as the guardian. Four of the respondents marked Restrained, and three respondents wrote
in "Escaped". In the secondary data, in order, the numbers were 247, 196, and 136. It is
not known if any escaped in the secondary data, and no knowledge of who did the
guarding or restraining is available either. The reason for this absence of knowledge falls
once more on the lack of the original questionnaires submitted to the HOBAS.
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A subsection of information on the HOBAS Statistical Report on Victims is titled
Stockholm Syndrome. The Stockholm Syndrome, as widely accepted, is a term used to
describe a hostage situation during which the hostage taker gains support, sympathy, or
similar feelings from the hostages. These feelings can include adverse attitudes toward
law enforcement. Fortunately, the Stockholm condition is usually temporary. Regardless,
the table as presented in the HOBAS is offered. It answers questions 53 and 54 and
includes primary data answers as before.
Stockholm Syndrome
No
Yes - Negative feelings toward law enforcement
Yes - Positive feelings toward subject
Yes - Subject returned positive feelings to victim
Subject manipulated by victim?
6/494
1/22
6/48
0/20
Yes
No
3/49
10/506
According to the primary data, most of the victims were related to the subject in
one capacity or another. Five were family members, three were friends or co-workers,
five were former significant others or children of the subject (according to written n\
comments), and two were spouses or ex-spouses. The HOBAS states that no
relationships, other relationships, and unknown relationships constituted 235 of the
responses to question 55. That number was the largest in the series, with family coming
in next at 185. Significant others were 96, police officers were 8, employers 3, and
friends and co-workers number 88.
Question 56 describes the release of
the victim(s). In addition to what is shown,
56 Hostage/Victim release: (Select one)
1/90 Released at time of negotiated surrender
6/116 Released prior to resolution of
0/86 Negotiated release
ncident
4/107 Non-negotiated release
1/98 Rescued by tactical team
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there were two instances o( "Fled while subject was sleeping" written in on the
questionnaires. That makes the total for the primary series 14, which is due to the fact
that two victims were released by different means during the course of one incident.
Question 57, the status of the victim at the end of the incident, has been covered
previously in this document. Refer to the chart titled Injuries and Death on page 38.
The last two questions on the questionnaire are "Yes" or "No" in format. Did the
subject allow the victim to talk to law enforcement? In the primary data, there were five
negatives and five positives. In the HOBAS, there were 332 and 214, in order. Did the
subject talk to law enforcement through the victim? In the same order, eight and four and
434 and 82, with 39 "Unknown"s in the HOBAS.
Remember that Dr. Feldman from the University of Louisville School of
Medicine has conducted similar research. Dr. Feldman's work is geared more toward a
medical and negotiation interest, as opposed to that of law enforcement first responders,
special response teams, and the Georgia Bureau of Investigation. However, the Louisville
database has some very appropriate data that applies directly to the research. In the
sequence and titles found in the original document, the near mirror image data from
Louisville pertains to Age Range, Sex and Race of Hostage/Barricade Subjects, Criminal
History, Location of Hostage/Barricade Incidents, and Total Weapons. Each table as
listed will receive special consideration and comparison to this project's research in
individual sections over the course of the next few pages. Only the HOBAS statistics will
be compared with the Louisville database. Both sets of information are expressed in
percentages.
Dr. Feldman's Age Rang, table (of subjects) is broken down into four-year
increments beginning at the age of 10 and ending at the age of 69. These increments have
been grouped together as closely as possible to the similar HOBAS breakdown. Refer to
the table.
Louisville HOBAS
Under 19/18 20.28 3.4
20/18-29 34.97 29.3
30 - 44/45 34.26 44.8
45/46-64/65 9.80 13.1
65-69/Over 65 0.70 1.6
Considering the error of a slight variation among brackets, the two data sets are
relatively parallel, with the exception of the first age group. This is due to a skew
between the sets resulting from Dr. Feldman's report that indicates that 19.58% of the
subjects he studied were between 15 and 19 years of age. When the unknown number -
7.9% - of the HOBAS database is factored in, possible accountability for the large
difference in the early age brackets becomes apparent. By the way, there are no
'Unknowns' in Dr. Feldman's research, with the exception that age was not determined for
one subject.
In the areas of Sex and Race of Hostage/Barricade Subjects, charts from earlier
are revisited and edited to incorporate the Louisville data.
Louisville HOBAS
88.4
9.2
2.4
Gender
Male 97.92
Female 2.08
Unknown
Race
Native American N/A 2.9
African Amencan 33.33 19.5
Asian/Pacific Island 2.08 2.2
White 56.94 57.5
Hispanic 7.64 6.1
Other 10.1
Unknown 1 .6
The differences are not so different this time. Notice the White category: barely
half of a percentage point apart. The same applies to the Asian/Pacific Island category.
The African/American category, however, is substantially different.
The Criminal History portion of the Louisville database includes types of actual
crimes, as opposed to the primarily violent or not nature of the HOBAS. Therefore, only
the existence of a criminal history is compared here. In any event, this category is almost
evenly split, in any way that it is viewed. At least some consistency is being maintained.
Louisville HOBAS
History: Yes/No 52.08/47.92 50.1/52 (with "UnknowiV's)
Location of Hostage/Barricade Incidents is difficult to categorize. The HOBAS
has fewer listings for incident location than Dr. Feldman does. In the table below, the
HOBAS locations are listed first, at the far left. As appropriate, locations from the
Louisville database are indented and under the HOBAS locations, so that the difference
in categories will be noted. Otherwise, the Louisville categories fall under those of the
HOBAS. This reassignment is arbitrary and is meant to include all of information from
Louisville about location.
Louisville HOBAS
Location
Apartment/Condo N/A 20.9
Mobile Home " 4.3
Private Home/Farm 42.50 52.8
Automobile N/A 2.5
Barn/Out-Building " 0.5
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Office/Workplace 10.00 3.2
Public Transit N/A 0.1
Other see below 15.8
Restaurant/Bai 10.83 N/A
Convenience Store 7.50
School 6.67
Gov't Facility 10.83
Medical Facility 5.00
Hotel/Motel 3.33
Retail Store 2.50
Media Facility 0.83
These numbers are obviously difficult to compare. The one location that jumps
out is the private home, regardless of type of structure. The student or professional of
these matters would also keep in mind that virtually no location is exempt from these
incidents, as carefully detailed by Dr. Feldman.
Total Weapons appeals to a very specific audience, the members of which should
be obvious. Dr. Feldman's multiple elements in his Total Weapons table fall nicely into
the categories of the HOBAS.
Louisville HOBAS
Weapon tvpes
Knife 10.44
Ha. idgun 61.54
Shoulder Weapon 10.99
Other 8.79
None 8.24
13.8
39.1
27.0
12.3
20 6
The last element listed is inclusive of the category of "Physical Assault" in Dr.
Feldman's research. It is not debated that a physical assault includes a weapon. Category
and definition matching to the HOBAS are the purposes of such a liberty, and apologies
are made to Dr. Feldman. There are some notable differences in the weapons table. The
inverse relationship among the types of guns used may require special attention in the
future. That may also be a local or regional issue, which could be of obvious interest.
Findings Keyed to Each Hypothesis
Now that the results have been sufficiently reviewed, the testing phase of this
project begins. The hypotheses are listed again as a refresher:
1
.
Critical incidents share common traits.
2. Perpetrators of critical incidents share common traits.
3. In Georgia, either by event or individual, the traits of critical incidents
differ from the national commonalties.
The initial inclination should be that hypotheses one and two are true, based on the
numbers and comments provided in the section above. Closer review is necessary though.
According to all sets of data, or combinations of them as compared, critical
incidents share a number of common traits. The common traits that are listed below
include all of those in which a comparison revealed that there were remarkable and large
similarities among the data sets. A cut-off score - such as a certain percentile - was not
established. There are too many unknowns and too little primary data to justify such strict
measuring of similarities or differences in this project.
Other than similarities by definition - hostages, barricade, and barricade with
weapons - there exist a substantial number of common traits to most of the incidents
studied. Those common traits are as follows:
The incidents are not planned,
tost incidents occur in private residences.
Weapons are used more often than not, especially firearms.
Violence occurs most of the time.
When violence occurs, law enforcement officers are the largest number
of victims, followed by selected victims/hostages, then random victims.
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Law enforcement initiates contact with the subject almost always.
When tactical actions occur, they are usually deliberate in nature.
This list describes several of the fundamental aspects of these incidents that occur
as they unfold. Based on the research, interested parties may conclude that critical
incidents will contain some, if not all, of the above basics. The first hypothesis is
supported.
The second hypothesis is similar to the first, but deals strictly with the subject or
perpetrator of the incidents. This area should spark some interest across the board,
because the second hypothesis was supported quite well.
Subject demographics match each other quite well. Inspector Ingram of the GBI
had it right when he coined the term "angry white male syndrome". The commission of
these events by females is nearly nonexistent. Most of the males were white, and they
most frequently fell into an age bracket starting at 30 and ending at 45. Furthermore,
about half of the perpetrators had a criminal history. All three sources of data reflect these
results.
The Georgia factor is a term from the last hypothesis. The term reflects the
curious question of whether or not these incidents as rU ey occur in Georgia are somehow
unique or different than the national indications. This is where the lack of primary data
hurts this project the most. This hypothesis is not supported.
Two categories come to mind, however, when drawing early conclusions about
the Georgia factor. The first is the injuries/deaths category that was charted earlier. More
officers were injured and/or killed in Georgia than other officers across the states
(liberties with percentages taken). That is a rough assessment, but may be indicative of a
trend. The conclusion is brought to bear to further drive home the need for additional
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research into these matters. The types of weapons used also warrant some attention in
Georgia. It may come as no surprise to Georgia law enforcement officers that the subjects
use long guns (shotguns and rifles) more often than short guns (pistols and revolvers).
Some additional areas under the Georgia umbrella that appear different than the
national and/or Louisville statistics are listed. Further elaboration is mere conjecture at
this point, so the list concludes the investigation into this matter for the time being. The
difference in age of the Georgia offenders and those subjects across the country has been
discussed in the previous section.
Communications with subjects in Georgia usually involve face-to-face
discussions, as opposed to electronic means.
More tactical interventions occur in Georgia than elsewhere.
More of the subjects are married.
The first two hypotheses are supported by the research/data. The third is not.
There are plenty of law enforcement officers across the country that could describe some
of the items that have been validated herein. However, now they can say those things
with more credibility than before, if the research is reviewed.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The individual reader will largely determine the conclusions drawn from this
project. The fact that older, white males commit most of these incidents is obvious just by
review of the statistics. Since hypotheses one and two were supported by the data, these
incidents, no matter where they occur, receive exclusive membership into a very unique
club.
More importantly though, the issue that the HOBAS - despite its faults - is a
useful tool for the purpose of profiling these incidents is not to be missed. For those
individuals who are interested in the areas of hostage and barricaded gunmen situations,
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the HOBAS and what it reveals is a valuable new tool. The trick is to understand the
HOBAS and implement it as necessary. This is particularly important to law enforcement
first responders and special response team commanders.
Specifically speaking, the GBI has initiated a project that will ultimately benefit
their SRT in a variety of ways. The HOBAS information will be of use to them, and the
GBI's information will be of use to the HOBAS and all other agencies that reap similar
rewards from it. Furthermore, in Georgia, the bureau is on the leading edge of
information technology that is available to law enforcement. Once the word gets out that
the GBI is using such a database, and that use has had some positive impact on critical
incident responses and resolution, other agencies across the state will want to come on
board. Perhaps, in the future, the GBI will have it's own database of information that will
be exclusive to the state.
It is recommended that the GBI continue to move forward with this project. For
others, it is advised that longitudinal research be conducted, even if the HOBAS is the
only source of data. The burning question about the study of the HOBAS over time is
whether or not some of the answers will change or shift. If so, what are those changes
attributed to?
In any event, if primary data is available through the use of the questionnaire,
obtain that data by any reasonable means. The applications of the use of the data, from
any agency, can be critical to how an agency responds to - and resolves - these situations.
If such a measure is approved or supported, in any organization, it is further advised that
at least one individual be dedicated to the project on a full-time basis. There are simply
too many details, too much data collection, and too much analysis to be taken on by a
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professional or student who cannot devote all of their efforts to the same. Furthermore, a
briefing of some type or another may be necessary prior to the distribution of the
questionnaires.
Plenty of time should be allotted for academic or professional pursuit of
everything that the HOBAS has to offer. This is especially important if information is
desired on past incidents, which was the case with the GBI. An endeavor such as this
cannot be completed in a project type of timeframe of a few days or a few months. The
reasons for this point, and the others, will become clear in the following section.
LIMITATIONS
Regrettably, the limitations to this project are quite numerous. The primary
limitations involve the HOBAS database and the information-gathering tool, that being
the questionnaire. Other limitations include time and resource restraints. The small
quantity of primary data has been adequately covered.
The questionnaire is of very poor design. While the information gained is quite
useful, the means of getting it are too objective. There are too many questions that are
open-ended in nature, including the ones where several answer options are provided. As
should have been observed throughout the course of the results and questionnaire review,
the biggest indicator of this problem are the blanks for specification on many of the
questions. There are no less than 22 opportunities on the questionnaire for the respondent
to write in specific answers, 'other
1
answers, and the like. An initial thought on how to
resolve this situation is to limit the number of write-in options and/or dictate that fixed-
alternative answers sr mid be marked as close as possible to what the actual answer is.
Along the same lines, write-in answers also occurred when no write-in was necessary.
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This scenario should be similarly addressed. Furthermore, if the questions on the
questionnaire cannot be designed in a 'yes
1
or 'no
1
format, then there needs to be more
fixed-alternatives and/or closed answers. Wading through the write-ins is quite time
consuming. The hand written answers may be valid and relevant to the question, but the
collection, tabulation, and analysis of the data becomes skewed.
Another factor relaed to poor questionnaire design is length. Including the
narrath c, the whole document is five pages long. There are 59 questions, and well over
200 choices of answers. (Coding the answers would be a requirement if large amounts of
questionnaires were used to obtain primary data.) The large quantities of choices do not
include any answers that require additional clarification as described above. The number
of questions and answers for subjects and victims increases by 100% if there .re more
than one of each. Poor respondent cooperation becomes a big factor - and shortcoming -
quite rapidly. Should case files have to be reviewed for details, or should a narrative be
written, then the time required for completion of the questionnaire can jump
exponentially.
The HOBAS database, as good as it is, is not perfect either. As discussed
numerous times already, there is information requested on the questionnaire that is not
even covered in the database. Regardless of assigned importance, the omission of these
particular subject areas is indicative of poor data dissemination. The database is
wonderful, but is hard to work with. The physical layout of the categories requires much
attention to detail. Some of the alternatives within the categories are out of sequence with
the ones as found on the questionnaire. Therefore, it is quite possible that when
comparing a number of questionnaires with a database document, as in this project, the
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assignment of the number of answers can be different than the actual results. Parsimony
is a key to this research, based primarily on the volume of individual datum. It would be
nice if the database mirrored the questionnaire in these respects.
Tim. constraints were a factor in completion of the research in this project. For
example, the answer frequencies discussed in the results section were just that - counts of
answers. The conclusions and comments did not include how many white males used
weapons, for example. There was no tabulation or analysis of what the raw totals
indicated within themselves. To determine how many white males used long guns in a
mobile home hostage situation, or any other combination of what the numbers categorize,
would be an enormous task yielding astronomical results. The possible scenarios that
could be analyzed under the larger umbrella of research must number in the hundreds, at
least.
Work was done on this project over the course of almost two years. The primary
researcher worked part-time on the information frequently, as did several individuals
within the GBI, namely Special Agent Keith Howard. None of the parties involved could
fully dedicate themselves to the project, and all had primary professional or academic
duties that required most of their attention. The point here is that, as described, this type
of work is quite time consuming. For future reference, the time issue will require serious
consideration before any more work on similar matters is launched.
Researcher bias is a factor in this project, but a small one. Exposure to two
barricaded gunmen situations did not slant the work at all. Conversely, those experiences
better armed the author to conduct the research, talk with the respondents, review case
files, develop rapport with various parties, and so on. There is some concern about the
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continued work that the GBI will pursue relative to the HOBAS project, primarily
because of the investment made. The academic interest in this project is limited to the
elected choice of CO: pleting a project of this nature. Subject matter is irrelevant.
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APPENDIX
< ">mpleted primary data questionnaires (24).
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